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THERE BUT FOR FORTUNE: REAL-LIFE VS.




Lawyers learn vicariously as well as through personal experience.
That, of course, is the theory of the Socratic Method: the professor
asks a series of questions that engages one law student in a process of
reasoning and analysis, while the rest of the students in the class
participate vicariously. In the words of the late Harvard Law School
professor, Phillip E. Areeda, the others "silently pretend that they
must answer the question."'
No doubt, legal ethics is a subject that most lawyers would prefer to
learn vicariously. That is one reason why legal periodicals pay such
close attention to lawyers who get into trouble, whether with courts,
disciplinary agencies, or criminal authorities. The stories of other
lawyers' ethical dilemmas serve as moral tales. We hope to learn from
them, and thereby avoid other lawyers' mistakes.2
The problem with these real-life tales, however, is that they are
often incomplete. When lawyers' questionable professional conduct
becomes the subject of embarrassing news stories, precisely what the
* Louis Stein Professor, Fordham University School of Law. This article expands on
an essay that previously appeared in the Federal Bar Council News. Brian Hufnagel,
Fordham Law 2002, provided valuable research assistance.
1. Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method, 109 Harv. L Rev. 911, 916 (1996).
2. Certainly, lawyers in practice should also learn about professional
responsibility from the experience they and their colleagues accumulate. Within law
schools, at least, there are opportunities to do so, both in the context of law school
clinical settings, see, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics With Stories
About Clients, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 421 (1998). and in simulation courses. See, e.g.,
Robert P. Burns, Teaching the Basic Ethics Class Through Simulation: The
Northwestern Program in Advocacy and Professionalism, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer/Autumn 1995, at 37; Robert P. Burns, The Purposes of Legal Ethics and the
Primacy of Practice, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 327 (1998); Carol Bensinger Liebman,
The Profession of Law: Columbia Law School's Use of Erperiential Learning
Techniques to Teach Professional Responsibility, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer/Autumn 1995, at 73. It is unclear whether and to what extent lawyers in
practice draw on their own experience and the experience of their colleagues as an
occasion for similar, systematic self-reflection. Cf Bruce A. Green, Why Should
Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 Fordham Urb. LJ. 607, 641-42 (1999) (suggesting the
importance for prosecutors of learning from mistakes).
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lawyers did and why they did it may never become fully apparent.
The result is that, at times, the moral of the story is itself ambiguous.
As an alternative to a real-life "case study," one might create a
fictional one, drawing for inspiration on a real-life account.
Continuing legal education programs often take this approach.
Sometimes, the events forming the basis of the "hypothetical" are
intentionally ill-disguised, in which case participants may draw on
their own knowledge of the real-life events to add color to the
fictional narrative.
Through an imagined portrayal of lawyers' inner motivations and
private exchanges, the fictional account provides a vehicle for fleshing
out a reported story's broad outline of events. Of course, different
imaginations may yield different accounts. Moreover, different
accounts may yield different morals. A fictional version may reflect
its author's best effort to imagine what went on in the minds of the
lawyers, and how the lawyers interacted with each other. On the
other hand, the author may specifically tailor his narrative to make
particular points.
When an account is fictional rather than genuine, however, lawyers
may not take it as seriously or identify with it as strongly. Knowing
that the events are, to some extent, untrue, lawyers may be less willing
to put themselves in the place of the lawyers in the tale.
To illustrate the comparative shortcomings of real-life versus
fictional accounts, this Article offers parallel case studies. The first is
based on publicly reported events involving lawyers of the brokerage
firm, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, and other lawyers with whom they
interacted. Those who wrote about these events sought to draw
lessons from them, but because the reported story was factually
incomplete, the moral to be drawn from it was distressingly
ambiguous. The second case study is a fictional retelling of the first.
It offers a fuller picture, yet may be less effective for being untrue.
I. THE REPORTED AccouNT
Real-life accounts of lawyers' professional dilemmas tend to be told
in a series of news stories. Each story reveals only a small amount of
information. Over time, as more information surfaces, earlier
accounts prove to be untrue or, at least, inconsistent with later ones.
Even when all the stories are collected and an attempt is made to find
the lowest common denominator, some facts will remain disputed and
many more will remain omitted. Unrevealed facts are often far more
significant than those disclosed, and their absence may render any
search for a meaningful moral lesson a fruitless endeavor. Consider,
for example, the following tale.
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A. The Lawyers' Tale
The story begins around April of 1998, when Morgan Stanley fired
an analyst named Christian Curry shortly after nude photographs of
him appeared in a pornographic magazine. The firm's explanation
for the termination was that Curry had filed false expense reports.!
Curry, however, claimed that he was dismissed because he is black,
and because the firm wrongly believed him to be gay.' In response to
the firm's allegation that Curry filed false expense accounts, Curry
claimed the existence of a corporate culture that permitted expense
account abuse.6
What happened next is in dispute. According to press accounts,
Morgan Stanley was approached some months later by an individual,
C. Joseph Luethke, who had been acquainted with Curry since
college.7 Luethke claimed that Curry was plotting to plant racist e-
mails in the firm's computers in hopes of bolstering his civil lawsuit.8
Luethke volunteered to assist Morgan Stanley in thwarting Curry's
plans.9
In July of 1998, the Manhattan District Attorney's Office learned
about Curry's alleged plot and commenced an undercover
investigation." Luethke arranged a meeting between Curry and an
undercover police officer posing as a computer hacker." During that
meeting, Curry offered the undercover officer $200 to break into
Morgan Stanley's computers and plant racist and sexually charged e-
mails. 2 Curry was subsequently arrested and charged with forgery,
conspiracy, attempted trespass of a computer, and attempted
coercion. 13
It was then that Morgan Stanley's lawyers engaged in the
questionable conduct that is at the heart of this tale. Several days
3. David A. Kaplan, Financial Exposure, Career in Brief. Newsweek, June 21,
1999, at 52. According to one account, three years earlier Curry was interested in
modeling and decided to create a portfolio. Id. The photographer agreed to waive his$1,000 fee if Curry posed nude, and Curry signed a consent form giving up control of
the photos. Id.
4. Joseph Kahn, No Explanation on Payment as Yet by Morgan Stanley, N.Y.
Times, May 21, 1999, at C10.
5. Joel Cohen & Kevin Cumin, The Risks of Using Paid Informers: Review of the
'Morgan Stanley' Case, N.Y. L.J., July 9, 1999, at 1.
6. Curry v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 193 F.R.D. 168, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
7. Joseph Kahn, Wall SL Victim or Young Rogue?: Christian Curry Found
Trouble at Morgan Stanley, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1999, at B1.
8. Alison Frankel & Krysten Crawford, Nert Time, Don't Take Yes For an
Answer, Am. Law., July 1999, at 22.
9. Joseph Kahn, Mystery Grows Over Payment by Morgan Stanley, N.Y. Times,
May 26, 1999, at C1.
10. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 52.
11. Id.
12. Cohen & Cumin, supra note 5.
13. David Barstow, In Twist, Charges Against Former Morgan Stanlev Analyst Are
Dropped, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1999, at B7.
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after Curry's arrest, they authorized a $10,000 payment to Luethke
without notifying the District Attorney's Office.14 The payment
followed a conversation between one of Morgan Stanley's lawyers and
a partner in the New York City law firm, Davis Polk & Wardwell, the
brokerage firm's outside counsel, who advised that it would be lawful
for Morgan Stanley to pay Luethke a gratuity as long as Luethke
would not be a prosecution witness.15 The Morgan Stanley lawyers
never checked with the prosecutors, however, either to confirm that
Luethke would not be a witness or to see whether the prosecutors had
any general objections.'6 Moreover, the lawyers failed to tell the
prosecutors about the payment immediately after it was made.17
More than a month passed before the District Attorney's Office
first learned of the payment to Luethke. One press account implied
that the prosecutors first learned about the payment from Luethke
after he was arrested in a separate matter.'8 A later, and presumably
more accurate account indicated that the Assistant District Attorney
who was then responsible for the investigation learned about the
payment in a meeting with Morgan Stanley representatives, including
its outside counsel.'9 Afterward, some time passed during which,
presumably, the District Attorney's Office continued its investigation.
Then, one day, an Assistant District Attorney announced that his
office was dropping all charges against Curry because Morgan Stanley
had withheld information about the payment to Luethke.20 At the
same time, the prosecutors announced that they had begun an
investigation of Morgan Stanley itself.21 Apparently, this came as a
shock to both Morgan Stanley and its lawyers, none of whom appear
to have received notice that the prosecution had shifted its focus to
them.
At that point, the fortunes of several Morgan Stanley lawyers took
a turn for the worse. The firm suspended two of its senior lawyers
14. Laurie P. Cohen, Securities Firm Suspends Two in Curry Case, Wall St. J., May
28, 1999, at C1 [hereinafter Cohen, Securities Firm]. According to one article,
prosecutors have said that the $10,000 payment was wired "within days of" Curry's
arrest. Id.
15. Frankel & Crawford, supra note 8, at 22.
16. Id.
17. Cohen & Curnin, supra note 5.
18. Laurie P. Cohen, Chief of the Legal Team at Morgan Stanley Resigns, Wall St.
J., June 11, 1999, at C1 [hereinafter Cohen, Chief of the Legal Team]. According to
some accounts, knowledge of the payment from Morgan Stanley came "after Luethke
sent what Morgan Stanley in-house lawyers regarded as an extortion threat to firm
chairman Phillip Purcell." Frankel & Crawford, supra note 8, at 22. One report
suggests that Luethke made several phone calls and sent numerous letters harassing
Morgan Stanley officials for money. Cohen & Cumin, supra note 5.
19. Frankel & Crawford, supra note 8, at 22.
20. Barstow, supra note 13. In a television interview following news of the
payment to Luethke, Curry's attorney claimed that Curry was entrapped. See CNN
Moneyline News Hour With Lou Dobbs (CNN television broadcast, May 28, 1999).
21 Barstow, supra note 13.
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who apparently had played a role either in authorizing the payment to
Luethke, or in failing immediately to tell the prosecutors about it.'
The firm retained a different outside counsel to commence an internal
investigation.' Meanwhile, Curry filed a civil lawsuit against Morgan
Stanley and its officers, claiming that he had been wrongly terminated
and falsely arrested.24
In June of 1999, Morgan Stanley's outside counsel reported that
there was "no satisfactory explanation" for why Luethke had been
paid without the prosecutors' knowledge.' Morgan Stanley's leaders
called the payment a "mistake in judgment."' ' It was a costly mistake
at that. One of the two suspended lawyers stepped down from his
job;' Morgan Stanley's chief legal officer also resigned;-. its outside
counsel suffered embarrassment in the press;' and Morgan Stanley
lost its prosecutorial allies and had to defend itself against a criminal
investigation which appeared to have been prompted, in part, by
Morgan Stanley's failure to clearly and directly account for the
payment to Luethke on its books.3
In mid-July of 1999, the District Attorney's Office announced its
conclusion that Morgan Stanley's failure to disclose the $10,000
payment resulted from poor judgment and inexperience, not criminal
misconduct, and that charges would not be brought against the firm.31
The District Attorney's investigation of Luethke continued,
however,' as did Curry's civil lawsuit against Morgan Stanley.33
22. Cohen, Securities Firm, supra note 14.
23. Id.; see also Press Release, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. (June 10, 1999)
[hereinafter Press Release] (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison conducted the internal investigation and is also
defending Morgan Stanley in the civil suit filed by Curry. Today's News, N.Y. L.J.,
June 8, 1999, at 1.
24. Joseph Kahn, Morgan Stanley Suspends 2 Over Payment to an Informer, N.Y.
Times, May 28, 1999, at Al. The size of the lawsuit may grow-Curry's lawyer
reportedly has been contacted by others who may have claims against Morgan
Stanley. See Andrew Cave, Morgan Stanley Faces Second Racial Discrimination
Lawsuit, Daily Telegraph (London), Aug. 19, 1999, at 25.
25. Press Release, supra note 23.
26. Joseph Kahn, Inquiry is Ordered at Morgan Stanley; 2 Suspended Over$10,000
Payment, Int'l Herald Trib., May 29, 1999, at 9.
27. Cohen, Chief of the Legal Team, supra note 18. But see Anna Snider, Will
Morgan Fallout Affect Davis Polk?, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 1999, at 1 (suggesting that the
lawyer who stepped down was forced to resign).
28. Cohen, Chief of the Legal Team, supra note 18.
29. Snider, supra note 27.
30. Randall Smith, Morgan Stanley Won't Face Charges in Case Involving Curry,
Wall St. J., July 15, 1999, at C1. According to one account, Morgan Stanley lawyers
initially advised that the cost of the payment be allocated to the department where
Curry worked. Id. Despite these instructions, a mix-up caused the expense to be
placed in an unallocated account. Id.
31. Id.
32. Jesse Angelo, Feds Probe Luethke for Perjury in Curry Case, N.Y. Post, Jan.
28, 2000, at 28.
33. Curry v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 193 F.R.D. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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B. The Search For Insight
1. Moral Ambiguity-The Firm And Its Lawyers
Does the above story show professional misconduct-and if so, by
whom-or simply an error in judgment?
The press tended to lay blame at the feet of Morgan Stanley. There
were even initial suggestions that the firm may have engaged in
criminal wrongdoing. That, of course, was implied by the prosecutors'
decision to investigate Morgan Stanley. There was nothing in the
press accounts, however, to suggest that the firm had bribed Luethke
in order to influence his testimony, or that the firm had deliberately
withheld information from the prosecutors with an intent to defraud
them or somehow to obstruct justice. Indeed, the prosecutors' initial
suspicions were eventually allayed.
Blame also fell at the feet of the firm's lawyers-particularly,
although not exclusively, its in-house lawyers. Yet it is unclear
whether they acted improperly. For example, did they cross the
ethical line between permissible and impermissible witness payments?
The answer is uncertain not only because the news stories are
incomplete, but also because the ethical lines are themselves so
unclear. As a general rule, lawyers may not arrange to pay witnesses
for their testimony.' Lawyers may, however, arrange payments for
information or pay investigators to gather additional evidence.35 Was
the payment to Luethke an unethical payment for testimony or a
permissible payment for Luethke's "information" or "investigative
services?"
Likewise, although in hindsight it was certainly a mistake for the
lawyers not to confer with prosecutors about the payment, or at least
not to tell them about it immediately afterwards, it is uncertain that
the lawyers acted unethically. Here, too, the story is incomplete, and
34. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 7-109(C) (1981) ("A lawyer shall not
pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness
contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case.").
35. Ala. State Bar, Ethics Op. RO-83-77 (1982); Md. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on
Ethics, Ethics Dkt. 83-38 (1982); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op.
668 (1994) (discussing whether an attorney may pay an individual a fee for assistance
in the fact-finding process); see Jamaica Time Petroleum, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 366
F.2d 156, 158 (10th Cir. 1966) (holding that, in action on insurance policy on an
airplane, witness was not barred from testifying because insurance company's
attorney and investigator provided him a $1,000 reward for information concerning
who destroyed a plane; the payment simply "affects the credibility of the witness and
the weight to be given his testimony"); United States v. Medina, 41 F. Supp. 2d 38, 53-
55 (D. Mass. 1999) (recognizing distinction in criminal law between paying money for
information and paying money for testimony, and finding that cash payments of over
$100,000 and other benefits to witness were received for her investigative work and
not for her testimony).
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the ethical lines are unclear. While lawyers generally may not lie,'
there is nothing to suggest that anyone affirmatively lied to the
prosecutors. More likely, this was simply a case of nondisclosure.
Was there a duty to disclose? It is unlikely that there would have
been unless it can be said that the lawyers' failure to disclose the
payments would comprise "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation. ' 37  The line between permissible silence and
deceitful withholding is, however, an ambiguous one.3-'
2. Moral Ambiguity-The Prosecutors
In its coverage of this morality tale, the press entirely overlooked
the ambiguous moral conduct of the prosecutors. It was the
prosecutors, after all, who authorized the arrest of a man who, many
months later, they decided did not deserve to be prosecuted. In the
meantime, Curry was put through the considerable anxiety and
expense that result from facing felony charges-a personal ordeal to
which few would voluntarily submit.
Whether and to what extent the prosecutors are to blame is unclear,
not only because a complete public narrative of what happened is
absent, but also because the prosecutors failed to explain adequately
why, after having arrested Curry, they ultimately dismissed the
charges against him. Their silence permitted an inference that
Morgan Stanley, not the District Attorney's Office, was principally to
blame: the arrest and prosecution were warranted based on the
prosecutors' initial information, but the prosecutors' later discovery of
the undisclosed witness payment required them to dismiss an
otherwise appropriate prosecution. It is unclear, however, how this
inference could have been accurate.
To begin with, it is unlikely that the prosecutors were troubled by
the mere fact that Luethke received compensation. Both prosecutors
and police routinely compensate their witnesses. Besides making cash
payments to "informants," 9 prosecutors often give "cooperators"
36. See, eg., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R_ 8.4(c) (1983).
37. 1d.
38. Compare Phila. Bar Ass'n Prof'I Guidance Comm., Op. 94-21 (1994) (stating
that disclosure of a client's incarceration, which may cause cessation of worker's
compensation benefits, is not required), with Ill. Formal & Informal Opinions, Op. 95-
10 (1996) (stating that in a contract negotiation, a lawyer for one party must disclose
to the other party when he has made a change in the document).
39. See United States v. Febus, 218 F.3d 784, 796 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the
government's cash payments to two witnesses is not per se outrageous but rather is
evidence that the jury can consider when weighing credibility); cf Bruce A. Green,
After the Falk The Criminal Law Enforcement Response to the S&L Crisis, 59
Fordham L. Rev. S155, S180-81 (1991) (noting that when payment to informant is
contingent on recovery of a reward, the informant's testimony could be influenced).
2000]
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something even more valuable: leniency or complete forbearance
from criminal prosecution for past crimes.4"
Similarly, the prosecutors would not have been discouraged simply
because Morgan Stanley may have engaged in sneaky, or even (as
they may first have thought) unlawful conduct. Prosecutors often
proceed with their cases after learning that wrongdoing occurred in
the course of the investigation-for example, when the police violate a
suspect's Fourth Amendment rights. Indeed, prosecutors do not
hesitate to make use of illegally obtained evidence where the
defendant lacks "standing" to suppress the evidence or where there is
an applicable exception to the exclusionary rule.41
Moreover, it is unclear that the undisclosed payment would have
made it significantly harder to prove that Curry engaged in criminal
conduct as charged. Luethke's testimony would have been admissible
even if the payment to him was improper. While the prosecutors may
have judged him to be a less credible witness because of his
demonstrable financial motive, prosecutions are routinely brought
based on the testimony of witnesses with all kinds of motives, biases,
and prejudices that defense counsel can probe on cross-examination in
order to discredit the witness. Further, the prosecution did not
entirely depend on Luethke's credibility as a witness. The most
important prosecution witness was, in all likelihood, the undercover
officer who Curry asked to plant the phony e-mails.
There was a better reason for dismissing the charges, but one that
suggests that the prosecutors may have made errors of judgment, if
not abused their discretion, in prosecuting Curry in the first place.
Following Curry's arrest, his lawyer suggested that Curry may have
been entrapped.42  Of course, the fact that Luethke received
compensation does not in itself establish an entrapment defense.43
Paid informants and salaried police officers frequently gather
evidence by inducing the target of the investigation to commit a
40. See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69 (1995);
Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 563 (1999); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and
Embellishment, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 917 (1999).
41. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980) (holding that the
individual had no "standing" to challenge admission of the evidence because he had
no legitimate or reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion into
another person's purse); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 947-48 (6th Cir. 1984)
(stating that "a guest at a party has no expectation of privacy and therefore no
standing to raise a fourth amendment claim regarding the search of the premises or
the seizure of items found there").
42. Cohen & Cumin, supra note 5.
43. See United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391,395-96 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding that
paying an informer on a contingent-fee basis does not establish an entrapment
defense); see also United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 545-46 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating
that payment of a large sum to an informer does not render testimony inadmissible);
George E. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 Tex. L. Rev.
203, 289 (1975) (same).
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crime." An entrapment defense, which ordinarily requires proof that
the defendant had no predisposition to commit the crime, is rarely
successful.45 In Curry's case, however, Luethke may have "set Curry
up" at the very outset-even before his meetings with Morgan Stanley
and the prosecution-in the hope of obtaining a reward. Further,
even assuming that the prospect of financial gain did not motivate
Luethke's behavior, or that Luethke's behavior simply was not
sufficiently coercive to establish entrapment as a matter of law, Curry
could nonetheless gain strategic mileage by focusing his defense on
entrapment, calling Luethke as a witness, and impeaching Luethke
with proof of the $10,000 payment.
The undisclosed payment to Luethke made prosecuting Curry much
more difficult. Even if an entrapment defense seemed implausible
under the law, the case could no longer easily be portrayed as one in
which Curry, the defendant, had acted improperly to gain an
advantage in a civil disagreement with Morgan Stanley. With the
discovery of the undisclosed payment, it began to look like a case in
which Morgan Stanley, the supposed victim, had acted just as badly
for its own civil advantage. Although prosecutors do not necessarily
make charging decisions based on the moral worthiness of the victims,
it would have been justifiable for the prosecutors to wish "a plague o'
both your houses!"'  Even if the prosecutors did not themselves feel
that way, a jury might. Even worse, the jury (not to mention the
general public) might see this as a case of the state and corporation
teaming up against "the little guy." Given the likely legal difficulties
and the prosecution's lack of public appeal, the District Attorney's
Office might have concluded that, even if Curry's conduct was
criminal, this was not a worthy case on which to expend limited
resources.
If using resources efficiently was the prosecutors' main concern,
however, then should they not have made efforts at the outset of the
investigation-and certainly before authorizing Curry's arrest-to
discover whether Luethke had a financial motive for manufacturing a
crime? Morgan Stanley's lawyers may not have recognized the
importance of this fact, but certainly any capable prosecutor would
have. This is precisely the sort of information that prosecutors are
constitutionally obligated to disclose to the defense.47 Had the
44. See United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing
elaborate undercover "Abscam" investigation where four United States Congressmen
and three other defendants were convicted after accepting bribes from investigators);
see also United States v. Trejo, 136 F.3d 826, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting
defendant's claim that the government induced him to sell guns by providing him with
drugs which caused him to become intoxicated and thus made him incapable of
resisting the informant's suggestions of engaging in illegal activity).
45. Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 Minn. L Rev. 163, 266 (1976).
46. William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 3, sc. 1.
47. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1985) (reversing conviction
2000]
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prosecutors asked about Luethke's complete dealings with Morgan
Stanley, or even about his expectations of a reward, can it be doubted
that they would have received truthful answers, if not from Luethke,
then certainly from Morgan Stanley's lawyers? Likewise, if the
prosecutors' ultimate conclusion was that the case lacked jury and/or
public appeal, why did this insight materialize so late? Could they
possibly have believed in the beginning that Morgan Stanley needed
the prosecution's protection? Would it not have been obvious from
the outset that, from the public's perspective, the prosecutors might
appear to be allied with Morgan Stanley in its efforts to undermine
Curry's civil claim?
3. Ambiguous Morals
In the legal press, this was called a "cautionary tale."48 Reading
press accounts, other lawyers may have sought to gain wisdom from
the woes of Morgan Stanley's lawyers. But what lessons could they
draw? Because the tale was incompletely told, the most important
teachings are probably not the most obvious ones.
Some observers suggested, for example, that private lawyers ought
to deal cautiously with witnesses who offer to provide information,
especially those who seek financial reward.49 Of course, the same
advice might also apply to prosecutors. Another kernel of wisdom,
perhaps offered self-servingly by lawyer-commentators, is that in-
house corporate lawyers should hire outside counsel to conduct
investigations. 0 These are not, however, weighty moral lessons. In all
likelihood, a more complete account would have yielded a more
interesting and more important lesson.
Consider some of the unanswered questions about Morgan
Stanley's lawyers: How did it happen that experienced and capable
in-house lawyers and outside counsel allowed their corporate client to
engage in conduct that, in hindsight, seems so clearly to have been ill-
advised, regardless of whether it was lawful or ethical? Did a lawyer
engage in a deliberate, albeit erroneous, weighing of the benefits and
risks before authorizing the witness payment? Did outside counsel
too narrowly confine his role to advising about the lawfulness of the
proposed conduct without regard to its wisdom? Did Morgan
Stanley's in-house lawyers simply acquiesce in a decision made by
non-lawyers at Morgan Stanley, or otherwise fail to consider reasons
why this conduct might be imprudent? Did a lawyer make an
affirmative decision not to consult with the prosecutors before making
because prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense that key witnesses had been
compensated for their role in the investigation of defendant).
48. Catherine Aman, Lessons of Morgan's Scandal, Nat'l L.J., June 14, 1999, at
B1.
49. Cohen & Cumin, supra note 5.
50. Aman, supra note 48.
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the payment, or was this simply a matter of inaction by a number of
lawyers, none of whom saw it as their responsibility to pick up the
phone?
Now, consider some of the unanswered questions about the lawyers
in the Manhattan District Attorney's Office: How did it happen that
experienced and capable prosecutors brought criminal charges against
someone who presumably would not have been charged at all if one
additional, easily ascertainable fact had been known? Why did
prosecutors fail to learn, before authorizing the arrest, that their
informant expected a reward? Why did weeks go by before they
learned of the informant's apparently mercenary intent? Should the
prosecutors who made the decisions have been better trained?
Should they have been better supervised? Did they rely too heavily
on the police or on Morgan Stanley, or were they simply too busy to
perform a thorough investigation themselves? Was it fair for
prosecutors to make Morgan Stanley the "fall guy" for their dismissal
of Curry's prosecution, or should they have acknowledged that they
should never have authorized Curry's arrest in the first place and that
the mistake in doing so was primarily their own?
Answers to these questions would yield some understanding of how
mistakes are made by lawyers individually and collectively within a
law office or prosecutor's office. In turn, these answers might yield
some lessons about how to structure decision-making to reduce the
risk of mistaken judgments and ethical lapses. Unfortunately, the
real-life case study is unlikely to yield answers to questions such as
these, and thereby diminishes the value of the case study as a vehicle
for learning vicariously about legal ethics.
III. THE FICTIONAL ACCOUNT
If the Morgan Stanley situation is illustrative, then real-life lawyer
tales tend to be both incomplete and unreliable. To some extent,
press accounts may be inconsistent with each other and disputed by
the parties. More importantly, they may omit most of what one would
need to know about the lawyers' conduct, knowledge, motivations and
interrelationships in order to resolve the moral ambiguity of the
situation. This is predictably so, because lawyer protagonists
generally have little incentive to publicize their conduct, and because
the obligation of client confidentiality might prevent them from doing
so even if they were willing. The famous "buried bodies" case is a
rare example of a real-life professional dilemma that was eventually
exposed in all its gory detail. 51 It is highly valued among legal ethics
51. See, e.g., Richard Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, The Moral Compass of the
American Lawyer 7-26 (1999) (describing dilemma of lawyers whose client confided
that he had murdered two young women whose bodies had not been found and
disclosed to the lawyers the whereabouts of the bodies).
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teachers precisely for this reason. More often, however, legal ethics
teachers attempt to compensate for the apparent factual shortcomings
of real-life stories by developing fictional accounts. By doing so,
teachers can fill in some (but by no means all) of the gaps so that the
tale is more likely to reveal lessons applicable to lawyers' practice.
Whether lawyers will actually derive such lessons from fictional
accounts is, however, questionable. Precisely because the stories are
contrived, lawyers will be less inclined to empathize or identify with
the "characters," and therefore will be less likely to recognize the
fictional lawyers' situation as relevant to their own. Consider, for
example, the following tale.
A. The Lawyers' Tale
Arnold Inhouse is an assistant general counsel at a prominent
national brokerage firm, Broker Inc. Inhouse loves his job-the hours
are good, and the benefits are many. He is a real go-getter, and
voraciously seeks out added responsibility. Unfortunately for him, the
most interesting-and potentially the most praiseworthy-work is
often given to attorneys at large corporate law firms in the city. Much
to Inhouse's aggravation, his superiors seem to have more respect for
the judgment of outside attorneys than for his own, and even the
associates at law firms sometimes ooze disdain for his ideas despite
the fact that he himself was once an associate at a prestigious law firm.
Inhouse has been looking into the company's discharge of a broker,
Peter Pinkslip. It seems pretty clear that Pinkslip had been inflating
his expenses. But Pinkslip has hired a lawyer, who insists that Pinkslip
was fired because he is black, and because, having posed nude for
photographs that were later published in a magazine catering to gay
men, he was mistakenly believed to be homosexual. Inhouse relishes
his control over the case, although he recognizes that it will likely soon
be transferred to outside counsel.
One day, Fabian Fink, a gentleman who describes himself as
Pinkslip's "friend," comes to Broker Inc. and finds his way to Inhouse.
Fink explains that Pinkslip solicited his assistance in a plot to plant
racist e-mails in the brokerage firm's computer system in hopes of
bolstering his discrimination claim. Moreover, Fink valiantly
volunteers his assistance in exposing Pinkslip's devious plan, then
further volunteers that he is down on his luck financially. Inhouse
eagerly accepts Fink's assistance, but explains that Fink cannot be
compensated because his credibility might then be subject to attack.
With a wink and a nod, however, Inhouse asks Fink to trust that
Broker Inc. will do right by him.
52 E.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Legal Tender: A Lawyer's Guide to Handling
Professional Dilemmas (1995); Zitrin & Langford, supra note 51.
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Shortly thereafter, Fink independently contacts the District
Attorney's Office, which assigns the matter to Patricia Peerless, a
righteous young Assistant District Attorney. Peerless immediately
arranges for investigators in the District Attorney's Office to debrief
Fink. She then arranges a meeting with Inhouse and others from his
company to learn whatever she can from them. Afterward, she is
thrilled about the possibility of pursuing a conviction in what may turn
out to be a well-publicized case. She consults with her supervisors,
and all agree that planting e-mail in a corporation's computer system
is a gravely serious crime meriting assiduous investigation, and that
the most effective way to proceed is through an undercover operation.
Working with the police, Peerless devises a plan for Fink to
introduce Pinkslip to an undercover investigator posing as a computer
hacker. Investigators carry out the plan, Pinkslip offers the
undercover officer $200 to plant e-mails in the Broker Inc. computers,
and the police arrest Pinkslip on the spot. Inhouse learns about the
arrest from the press, and is annoyed and embarrassed not to have
had better and more timely information.
Shortly after the arrest, Fink arranges to meet with Inhouse. Fink
fervidly describes the "sting operation," boasting that Pinkslip is
"dead to rights" because the $200 offer was made to an undercover
investigator. He predicts with confidence that Pinkslip will have to
plead guilty, then casually raises the issue of his own financial
difficulties and wonders whether Broker Inc. might pay him, say,
$10,000 as a reward for his past assistance. Inhouse is sympathetic for
several reasons. He has grown fond of Fink over the course of their
dealings. He recognizes that Fink played a difficult role, that Fink
may be criticized for turning against a friend, and that Fink's
willingness to do so was of great value to the company. Further,
Inhouse recalls that, in the course of their prior dealings, there may
have been some tacit understanding that Fink would receive
compensation for his services.
Inhouse does not give much thought to how paying Fink might
affect any future civil litigation Pinkslip might bring against Broker
Inc.; that is now outside counsel's responsibility. Inhouse also
disregards how the prosecutors might perceive the payment. It was
they, after all, who rejected his participation in the investigation in the
first place. But, congratulating himself on his alertness and prudence,
Inhouse does wonder whether there might be some legal impediment
to paying Fink a financial reward, and decides to get a quick opinion
from Samuel Sage, a partner in an outside law firm with which
Inhouse is dealing in another matter.
Inhouse telephones Sage and summarizes what he regards as the
relevant facts, including that in the unlikely event that Pinkslip goes to
trial, Fink most likely will not have to testify. Inhouse asks whether,
under these circumstances, there is any law against making a payment
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to Fink. Although Sage does not have a background in criminal
investigations, he considers himself perfectly competent to deliver a
simple legal opinion based on the given set of facts. A man of his
considerable accomplishment certainly would not want to suggest to
Inhouse that he was unqualified to give the requested assistance.
Besides, with the hard-working junior partners demanding an
increasingly large share of the firm's profits and an increasingly
expansive role in firm governance, he can hardly afford to cede
responsibility for an important client to another lawyer in the firm.
Sage does not probe to determine whether Inhouse's factual
understandings are correct. Further, he does not request any
additional information that might be necessary to consider fully the
non-legal implications of the payment, or that might be helpful in
determining whether the proposed payment is prudent in light of the
brokerage firm's civil dispute and the pending criminal prosecution. It
does not occur to Sage to give advice about the manner in which the
payment should be made, or about whether the Assistant District
Attorney should be consulted in advance or given notice immediately
afterwards. After all, Inhouse knows what services he wants and
needs, and is surely aware of the limits of those services. If Inhouse
requests a mere legal opinion, that is all he will receive. Thus, after
enlisting his associate to conduct the necessary research, Sage advises
Inhouse that, assuming that Fink will not be a witness, the payment
would be lawful.
Armed with Sage's advice, Inhouse asks his superiors in the general
counsel's office to authorize a $10,000 payment to Fink. Although the
general counsel wonders whether the payment will "smell fishy,"
Inhouse assures him that Sage concluded that the payment would be
perfectly legal and expressed no misgivings about making it.
Comforted by outside counsel's apparently comprehensive review of
the matter, Inhouse's superiors provide their authorization.
Meanwhile, although Pinkslip is under indictment, Peerless sees no
need to prepare the case for trial. She assumes that, like most
defendants, Pinkslip will plead guilty, and she knows that if the case
does go to trial, there will be time enough to prepare the case later on.
Besides, she has a lengthy backlog of cases to address, and this one
seems all but in the bag. It does not occur to her to meet with Fink,
much less to inquire into Fink's background and motivations. This is
so for any number of reasons, including that if Fink testifies at trial,
his role will be a minor one. Moreover, Fink's credibility is not really
at issue, because Pinkslip offered a payment directly to an undercover
investigator.
Several weeks after Pinkslip's arrest, Peerless again arranges to
meet with Inhouse and his company's outside counsel. At the
meeting, Peerless learns for the first time about the $10,000 payment
to Fink. She is initially indifferent; Pinkslip is guilty regardless. A few
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weeks later, however, when Pinkslip's counsel makes a request for any
evidence relevant to the defense of entrapment, she realizes that Fink
is a potential witness, that the payment may harm his credibility, and
that her carelessness may cost her a conviction.
Peerless apprehensively consults with her supervisors. They
anticipate that once the payment to Fink is disclosed, the prosecution
of Pinkslip -will not be a very sympathetic one from the media's
perspective. The press will likely portray the District Attorney's
Office as having been manipulated by a major corporation to take its
side in a civil dispute against a fired employee, and as having
cooperated by engaging in the kind of investigative excess
traditionally reserved for snaring drug dealers and mafia kingpins.
Fine points about who initiated the criminal investigation, whether the
payment came before or after Pinkslip's arrest, and whether Fink will
take the witness stand will likely not matter much to the public. The
press will have a field day.
The prosecutors conclude that Broker Inc. has provided an easy
way out: drop the charges against Pinkslip and announce an
investigation of the brokerage firm. Perhaps the firm had some
nefarious reason for making the payment without first consulting with
prosecutors. The obstruction-of-justice provision is far reaching
enough to justify such an investigation, regardless of whether the
investigation is likely to pan out. Anyway, even if Broker Inc. did not
act illegally, it surely acted stupidly and therefore deserves to be
embarrassed. Most importantly, announcing an investigation of
Broker Inc. will redeem and protect the prosecutor's office, placing it
firmly on the side of the victimized little guy and shifting the blame to
where it belongs: big business.
B. The Search For Insight
This fictional account answers some of the questions that are
unanswered by the real-life Morgan Stanley story as reported in the
press, because it describes in imagined fashion some of the
motivations of the fictional lawyers and some of their private
interactions-matters that press accounts rarely reveal. As a
consequence, the fictional account may provide a better vehicle for
considering what well-meaning lawyers do wrong and what they could
do differently. Among other things, this particular variation on the
Morgan Stanley case suggests the possible danger of "over-
compartmentalization" in law offices-for example, that lawyers'
roles and responsibilities in a matter may be too narrowly
circumscribed by their supervisors, their clients, or themselves; that
those with ultimate decision-making authority may lack sufficient
access to relevant facts; or that those with the greatest access to
relevant facts may not consider sufficiently the framework within
which their decisions should be made.
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In the fictional account, Inhouse might be criticized on several
scores, most of which seem at least partly attributable to his failure to
take a broad view of the possible implications of his decisions and the
full array of his client's interests. Although probably without intent,
he was potentially misleading in his initial dealings with Fink because
he did not give full consideration at that time to the possible limits on
the company's later ability to "do right by" Fink. When it then came
to deciding whether to reward Fink, he did not evaluate its
implications for the criminal case and his company's relationship with
criminal prosecutors, and thus did not consider how prosecutors might
perceive the payment. For that matter, he failed to evaluate the
payment's implications for the civil litigation brought by Pinkslip
against Broker Inc. He did not consult others in the company who
might have contributed to the decision, and was not forthcoming with
supervisors with whom he did consult in that he failed to convey the
conditional nature of Sage's advice.
Likewise, Sage might be criticized for providing limited and
conditional advice without being certain how it would be used, and for
failing to explore the company's possible need for more complete
advice. Had he been more experienced in criminal matters, Sage
might have recognized the importance of confirming with the
prosecutors that Fink would not be a witness, and of ascertaining
whether prosecutors had any other reasons for objecting to the
payment. Had he been more aware of his own limitations and less
possessive of the client, he might have consulted with other lawyers in
his firm who had greater experience in criminal matters. Even
without a background in this area, if he had conducted the research
himself, rather than delegating it to an associate, he might have
become more sensitive to the dangers of compensating a potential
witness, and therefore more inclined to press Inhouse on his factual
understandings.
Peerless might be criticized for failing to consider, at an earlier
stage, how concerns about the informant's credibility might have
significance for the office's exercise of prosecutorial discretion. As a
matter of "seeking justice,"53 perhaps she should have probed
weaknesses in the case before bringing charges. Additionally, perhaps
she should have considered at the outset how the public would
perceive the decision to pursue the case against Pinkslip, and later,
whether it was fair to go after Broker Inc. for conduct that appears to
have been "stupid" but, on reflection, not criminal. Her superiors
might be criticized for failing to solicit facts that, early on, would have
suggested that this was not an appropriate case to prosecute. Of
course, the District Attorney's Office might also be criticized for
53. See Green, supra note 2, at 612-18 (discussing origin of prosecutors' duty to
seek justice).
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misusing both its investigative powers and the press to embarrass
Broker Inc. and its lawyers as a way of distracting media attention
from its own initial misjudgments.
The fictional account suggests much more than the real-life Morgan
Stanley story about the motivations of the various lawyers who may
have gone slightly astray. It is understandable why Inhouse limited
the amount of information he disclosed to others and the extent to
which he enabled others to participate fully in decision-making. As a
matter of professional pride and professional standing within the
corporate counsel's office, he would naturally seek to squirrel
information and consolidate his authority. This tendency would only
be exacerbated by feelings of competitiveness with others in the
organization and by the sense that, as an in-house corporate lawyer,
other lawyers looked down on him-including the powerful
prosecutors who would not take him into their confidence, his own
superiors who placed greater value on the judgment of outside
counsel, and even law firm associates.
Similarly, the outside counsel's conduct is more easily
understandable in the fictional version. The story suggests that, like
many law firm partners, Sage was driven at least in part by economic
concerns, both the firm's and his own. He would have had an
individual interest in cultivating the client, in preserving that client's
confidence in him, and in working personally with the client. It would
be contrary to these interests for Sage to acknowledge that there were
other lawyers in the firm who were much better qualified to provide
the legal advice the corporate client requested.
Finally, the fictional version illustrates more clearly how
considerations of efficiency influence both supervisors and lower-level
prosecutors in a large, urban District Attorney's Office. Much of the
discretion vested in the District Attorney's Office will be reserved to
the supervisors, who are the more experienced attorneys. Yet the line
assistants will be entrusted to gather the information on which the
exercise of discretion will be based. This poses the danger that, for
any of several reasons, the lower-level prosecutor will not seek
relevant information or transmit it to the supervising attorneys. The
Assistant District Attorney, who carries a heavy case load and must
therefore herself act efficiently, may not see it as central to her role to
gather information relevant to her supervisors' discretionary
decisions. Not being privy to the supervisors' decision-making
criteria, the Assistant District Attorney may not recognize the
relevance of some information even if she is otherwise disposed to
gather it. Of course, in the case of an interesting or high profile
investigation, she may have even less of a personal incentive to look
for reasons not to bring charges.
Lawyers who encounter this story might recognize that the lawyers
in the tale were unexceptional in most respects. They were
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reasonably well-intentioned and, by all appearances, reasonably
competent in their fields. Their motivations and relations with other
lawyers were not aberrational. That is, they were like many lawyers.
Their unfortunate situation was avoidable, however, and their errors
were potentially symptomatic of broader failings. Their experience
might therefore suggest some lessons about lawyers' professional
conduct that other lawyers can relate to their own practice.
The lawyers in this tale, however, were exceptional in one
important respect: they were not real. Consequently, it is unclear
how readily lawyers will draw lessons from these lawyers' experiences.
Lawyers are likely to resist analyzing the motivations of fictional
lawyers and exploring the dynamic among them. A plausible response
will be, "No real lawyers would act that way."
Perhaps if the story were told more artfully, lawyers would be more
disposed to identify with fictional lawyers in the same way they
identify with lawyers in real-life tales. Unfortunately, many lawyer-
ethicists who might pen these case studies lack the novelist's art. Or,
perhaps the problem is not so much the inartfulness of the depiction
but the narrowness of legal education. As Edmund Burke famously
said, a legal education sharperns the mind by narrowing it. My
colleague, lawyer-novelist Thane Rosenbaum, made this point
forcefully after reading an earlier draft of this article. He observed:
The main point [this article] seem[s] to be raising incorporates a
larger critique about legal education and the practice of law.
Findings of fact are always treated as a cold record, concretely
recited, reported matter of factly without any hint of moral or
emotional complexity. Lawyers are trained this way, as if the
evolution of the law and the development of rules is more relevant
than the human dimension and drama that gets played out outside
the courtroom, and underneath the four corners of the complaint.
Lawyers and judges are never trained to think about moral lessons,
only whether the legal result was correct.
This is the flaw in legal education and practice, which is why...
lawyers will never be able to appreciate the moral lesson that comes
from a contrived, hypothetical tale, not just because they realized
that it was made up, but because the fictional tale is laced with
nuance, ambivalence, human frailties, subjectivities, ambitions and
motivations, wounded egos, raw emotions, petty jealousies and
rivalries, competitive fires and thwarted dreams. Cold records,
findings of fact, news reports, never show any of these dynamic
features of real life.
Lawyers simply never think this way, which is why.., these moral
lessons might not serve the ultimate ends of teaching legal ethics.
That's because in order to understand moral ambiguity, one has to
first accept the very presence of ambiguity in the lives of human
beings. As in the case that you present in this article, everyone
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needs to realize that lawyers are people first, just like any other
working stiff.
Facts, whether true stories or hypotheticals, are never cold and
emotionless, but always dynamic, animated and volatile. That's the
difference between journalism and fiction writing. Reporters merely
report what happened; fiction writers don't care so much about what
happened, but rather what the characters were thinking when they
were making the events happen.... It's the difference between the
outside world of flat description ("was the light green?" "who else
did you see in the restaurant that night?"), and the inside world of
conflict and motivation.
... [T]he point [is] that legal ethical conduct and moral lessons can't
be taught without a deeper appreciation and sensitivity to the inner
world, which is sadly not a part of a lawyer's training.4
Fictional vignettes like those found in legal ethics case books5 may
be useful to help lawyers both identify situations where particular
ethics rules may apply and explore the ambiguity in those rules,-, but
it is unclear whether they are equally useful for delineating the moral,
emotional, psychological and sociological truths of legal practice. If
one is trying to evoke empathy-to encourage other lawyers to
experience situations vicariously-can one do it effectively with
fabricated tales?
CONCLUSION
The ideal "case study" in legal ethics may well be a fully fleshed out
account of how real lawyers dealt with a professional dilemma.
Regretfully, such real-life stories are few and far between. One is
then left with a choice between incomplete real-life stories, on one
hand, and somewhat fuller fictional narratives, on the other. Each has
its limitations. Compounding the limitations of case studies
54. E-mail from Thane Rosenbaum, Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law, to Bruce Green, Louis Stein Professor, Fordham University School of
Law (Oct. 12, 2000, 01:29:51 EST) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Along
similar lines, Professor Rosenbaum earlier noted that lawyers "aren't known for a
particularly artistic personal style" and "are rarely thought of as elegant wTiters," and
suggested that the ability to write great literature would be undermined by "a lawyer's
training or perspective." Thane Rosenbaum, The Writer's Story, and the Lawyer's,
N.Y. Times Book Rev., Aug. 20,2000, at 27. He explained:
Most lawyers see the world through a much narrower lens than writers do,
one that has no aperture for the emotions. Some of this has to do with
training. The rest, I suspect, can be attributed to personality traits that draw
many people to study law in the first place.
Id.
55. See, eg., Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, Professional
Responsibility (7th ed. 2000).
56. See generally Thomas D. Morgan, Use of the Problem Method for Teaching
Legal Ethics, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 409 (1998).
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themselves are the limitations of lawyers as students of human nature.
If one accepts Thane Rosenbaum's critique that lawyers by training
are invariably insensitive to moral nuance and complexity, one might
well despair of developing lawyers' moral understanding through the
use of case studies or any other methodologies. Legal ethics
professors, however, being passionate about teaching this subject and
indefatigable in our efforts to overcome pedagogic hurdles, 7 are
unlikely to accept such a gloomy prognosis, however well-founded.
Therefore, we will persevere and, as we do, encourage learning from
the mistakes of other lawyers, be they real or fictional.
57. See Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 Wn.
& Mary L. Rev. 357, 357, 392 (1998).
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